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Abstract
Prediction is a complex notion, and different predictors (such as peo-
ple, computer programs, and probabilistic theories) can pursue very dif-
ferent goals. In this paper I will review some popular kinds of prediction
and argue that the theory of competitive on-line learning can benefit from
the kinds of prediction that are now foreign to it.
The standard goal for predictor in learning theory is to incur a small
loss for a given loss function measuring the discrepancy between the pre-
dictions and the actual outcomes. Competitive on-line learning concen-
trates on a “relative” version of this goal: the predictor is to perform
almost as well as the best strategies in a given benchmark class of pre-
diction strategies. Such predictions can be interpreted as decisions made
by a “small” decision maker (i.e., one whose decisions do not affect the
future outcomes).
Predictions, or probability forecasts, considered in the foundations of
probability are statements rather than decisions; the loss function is re-
placed by a procedure for testing the forecasts. The two main approaches
to the foundations of probability are measure-theoretic (as formulated by
Kolmogorov) and game-theoretic (as developed by von Mises and Ville);
the former is now dominant in mathematical probability theory, but the
latter appears to be better adapted for uses in learning theory discussed
in this paper.
An important achievement of Kolmogorov’s school of the foundations
of probability was construction of a universal testing procedure and re-
alization (Levin, 1976) that there exists a forecasting strategy that pro-
duces ideal forecasts. Levin’s ideal forecasting strategy, however, is not
computable. Its more practical versions can be obtained from the results
of game-theoretic probability theory. For a wide class of forecasting pro-
tocols, it can be shown that for any computable game-theoretic law of
probability there exists a computable forecasting strategy that produces
ideal forecasts, as far as this law of probability is concerned. Choosing
suitable laws of probability we can ensure that the forecasts agree with
reality in requisite ways.
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Probability forecasts that are known to agree with reality can be used
for making good decisions: the most straightforward procedure is to select
decisions that are optimal under the forecasts (the principle of minimum
expected loss). This gives, inter alia, a powerful tool for competitive on-
line learning; I will describe its use for designing prediction algorithms
that satisfy the property of universal consistency and its more practical
versions.
In conclusion of the paper I will discuss some limitations of competitive
on-line learning and possible directions of further research.
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 Universal consistency 3
3 Defensive forecasting 7
4 Calibration and resolution 13
5 Implications for probability theory 26
6 Defensive forecasting for decision making: asymptotic theory 29
7 Defensive forecasting for decision making: loss bounds 32
8 Conclusion 42
1 Introduction
This paper is based on my invited talk at the 19th Annual Conference on Learn-
ing Theory (Pittsburgh, PA, June 24, 2006). In recent years COLT invited talks
have tended to aim at establishing connections between the traditional concerns
of the learning community and the work done by other communities (such as
game theory, statistics, information theory, and optimization). Following this
tradition, I will argue that some ideas from the foundations of probability can
be fruitfully applied in competitive on-line learning.
In this paper I will use the following informal taxonomy of predictions (rem-
iniscent of Shafer’s [36], Figure 2, taxonomy of probabilities):
D-predictions are mere Decisions. They can never be true or false but can be
good or bad. Their quality is typically evaluated with a loss function.
S-predictions are Statements about reality. They can be tested and, if found
inadequate, rejected as false.
F-predictions (or Frequentist predictions) are intermediate between D-predic-
tions and S-predictions. They are successful if they match the frequencies
of various observed events.
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Traditionally, learning theory in general and competitive on-line learning in par-
ticular consider D-predictions. I will start, in Section 2, from a simple asymp-
totic result about D-predictions: there exists a universally consistent on-line
prediction algorithm (randomized if the loss function is not required to be con-
vex in the prediction). Section 3 is devoted to S-prediction and Section 4 to
F-prediction. We will see that S-prediction is more fundamental than, and can
serve as a tool for, F-prediction. Section 6 explains how F-prediction (and so,
indirectly, S-prediction) is relevant for D-prediction. In Section 7 I will prove
the result of Section 2 about universal consistency, as well as its non-asymptotic
version.
2 Universal consistency
In all prediction protocols in this paper every player can see the other players’
moves made so far (they are perfect-information protocols). The most basic one
is:
Prediction protocol
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Reality announces xn ∈ X.
Predictor announces γn ∈ Γ.
Reality announces yn ∈ Y.
END FOR.
At the beginning of each round n Predictor is given some data xn relevant to
predicting the following observation yn; xn may contain information about n
and the previous observations yn−1, yn−2, . . . . The data is taken from the data
space X and the observations from the observation space Y. The predictions
γn are taken from the prediction space Γ, and a prediction’s quality in light of
the actual observation is measured by a loss function λ : X×Γ×Y → R. This
is how we formalize D-predictions. The prediction protocol will sometimes be
referred to as the “prediction game” (in general, “protocol” and “game” will be
used as synonyms, with a tendency to use “protocol” when the players’ goals
are not clearly stated; for example, a prediction game is a prediction protocol
complemented by a loss function).
We will always assume that the data spaceX, the prediction space Γ, and the
observation space Y are non-empty topological spaces and that the loss function
λ is continuous. Moreover, we are mainly interested in the case where X, Γ,
and Y are locally compact metric spaces, the prime examples being Euclidean
spaces and their open and closed subsets. Traditionally only loss functions
λ(x, γ, y) = λ(γ, y) that do not depend on x are considered in learning theory,
and this case appears to be most useful and interesting. The reader might prefer
to concentrate on this case.
Predictor’s total loss over the first N rounds is
∑N
n=1 λ(xn, γn, yn). As usual
in competitive on-line prediction (see [9] for a recent book-length review of the
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field), Predictor competes with a wide range of prediction rules D : X → Γ. The
total loss of such a prediction rule is
∑N
n=1 λ(xn, D(xn), yn), and so Predictor’s
goal is to achieve
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, γn, yn) /
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, D(xn), yn) (1)
for all N = 1, 2, . . . and as many prediction rules D as possible.
Predictor’s strategies in the prediction protocol will be called on-line predic-
tion algorithms (or strategies).
Remark 1 Some common prediction games are not about prediction at all, as
this word is usually understood. For example, in Cover’s game of sequential
investment ([9], Chapter 10) with K stocks,
Y := [0,∞)K , Γ := {(g1, . . . , gK) ∈ [0,∞)K |g1 + · · ·+ gK = 1},
λ
(
(g1, . . . , gK), (y1, . . . , yK)
)
:= − ln
K∑
k=1
gkyk.
(there is no X; or, more formally, X consists of one element which is omitted
from our notation). The observation y is interpreted as the ratios of the closing
to opening price of the K stocks and the “prediction” γ is the proportions of
the investor’s capital invested in different stocks at the beginning of the round.
The loss function is the minus logarithmic increase in the investor’s capital.
In this example γ can hardly be called a prediction: in fact it is a decision
made by a small decision maker, i.e., decision maker whose actions do not affect
Reality’s future behavior (see Section 8 for a further discussion of this aspect of
competitive on-line prediction). For other games of this kind, see [52].
Universal consistency for deterministic prediction algo-
rithms
Let us say that a set in a topological space is precompact if its closure is compact.
In Euclidean spaces, precompactness means boundedness. An on-line prediction
algorithm is universally consistent for a loss function λ if its predictions γn
always satisfy
({x1, x2, . . .} and {y1, y2, . . .} are precompact)
=⇒ lim sup
N→∞
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, γn, yn)− 1
N
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, D(xn), yn)
)
≤ 0 (2)
for any continuous prediction rule D : X → Γ. The intuition behind the an-
tecedent of (2), in the Euclidean case, is that the prediction algorithm knows
that ‖xn‖ and ‖yn‖ are bounded but does not know an upper bound in advance.
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Of course, universal consistency is only a minimal requirement for successful pre-
diction; we will also be interested in bounds on the predictive performance of
our algorithms.
Let us say that the loss function λ is compact-type if for each pair of compact
sets A ⊆ X and B ⊆ Y and each constant M there exists a compact set C ⊆ Γ
such that
∀x ∈ A, γ /∈ C, y ∈ B : λ(x, γ, y) > M.
More intuitively, we require that λ(x, γ, y) → ∞ as γ → ∞ uniformly in (x, y)
ranging over a compact set.
Theorem 1 Suppose X and Y are locally compact metric spaces, Γ is a convex
subset of a Fre´chet space, and the loss function λ(x, γ, y) is continuous, compact-
type, and convex in the variable γ ∈ Γ. There exists a universally consistent
on-line prediction algorithm.
To have a specific example in mind, the reader might check that X = RK ,
Γ = Y = RL, and λ(x, γ, y) := ‖y − γ‖ satisfy the conditions of the theorem.
Universal consistency for randomized prediction algorithms
When the loss function λ(x, γ, y) is not convex in γ, two difficulties appear:
• the conclusion of Theorem 1 becomes false if the convexity requirement is
removed ([19], Theorem 2);
• in some cases the notion of a continuous prediction rule becomes vacuous:
e.g., there are no non-constant continuous prediction rules when Γ = {0, 1}
and X is connected.
To overcome these difficulties, we consider randomized prediction rules and ran-
domized on-line prediction algorithms (with independent randomizations). It
will follow from the proof of Theorem 1 that one can still guarantee that (2)
holds, although with probability one; on the other hand, there will be a vast
supply of continuous prediction rules.
Remark 2 In fact, the second difficulty is more apparent than real: for exam-
ple, in the binary case (Y = {0, 1}) with the loss function λ(γ, y) independent of
x, there are many non-trivial continuous prediction rules in the canonical form
of the prediction game [45] with the prediction set redefined as the boundary of
the set of superpredictions [19].
A randomized prediction rule is a function D : X → P(Γ) mapping the data
space into the probability measures on the prediction space; P(Γ) is always
equipped with the topology of weak convergence [6]. A randomized on-line pre-
diction algorithm is an on-line prediction algorithm in the extended prediction
game with the prediction space P(Γ). Let us say that a randomized on-line
prediction algorithm is universally consistent if, for any continuous randomized
prediction rule D : X → P(Γ),
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({x1, x2, . . .} and {y1, y2, . . .} are precompact)
=⇒
(
lim sup
N→∞
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, gn, yn)− 1
N
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, dn, yn)
)
≤ 0 a.s.
)
(3)
where g1, g2, . . . , d1, d2, . . . are independent random variables with gn distributed
as γn and dn distributed as D(xn), n = 1, 2, . . . . Intuitively, the “a.s.” in (3)
refers to the algorithm’s and prediction rule’s internal randomization.
Theorem 2 Let X and Y be locally compact metric spaces, Γ be a metric space,
and λ be a continuous and compact-type loss function. There exists a universally
consistent randomized on-line prediction algorithm.
Let X be a metric space. For any discrete (e.g., finite) subset {x1, x2, . . .}
of X and any sequence γn ∈ P(Γ) of probability measures on Γ there exists a
continuous randomized prediction ruleD such thatD(xn) = γn for all n (indeed,
it suffices to set D(x) :=
∑
n φn(x)γn, where φn : X → [0, 1], n = 1, 2, . . ., are
continuous functions with disjoint supports such that φn(xn) = 1 for all n).
Therefore, there is no shortage of randomized prediction rules.
Continuity, compactness, and the statistical notion of uni-
versal consistency
In the statistical setting, where (xn, yn) are assumed to be generated indepen-
dently from the same probability measure, the definition of universal consistency
was given by Stone [41] in 1977. One difference of Stone’s definition from ours
is the lack of the requirement that D should be continuous in his definition.
If the requirement of continuity ofD is dropped from our definition, universal
consistency becomes impossible to achieve: Reality can easily choose xn → c,
where c is a point of discontinuity of D, and yn in such a way that Predictor’s
loss will inevitably be much larger than D’s. To be more specific, suppose
X = Γ = Y = [−1, 1] and λ(x, γ, y) = |y − γ| (more generally, the loss is zero
when y = γ and positive when y 6= γ). No matter how Predictor chooses his
predictions γn, Reality can choose
xn :=
n−1∑
i=1
signγi
3i
, yn := − signγn,
where the function sign is defined as
signγ :=
{
1 if γ ≥ 0
−1 otherwise,
and thus foil (2) for the prediction rule
D(x) :=
{
−1 if x <∑∞i=1(signγi)/3i
1 otherwise.
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(Indeed, these definitions imply D(xn) = − signγn = yn for all n.)
A positive argument in favor of the requirement of continuity ofD is that it is
natural for Predictor to compete only with computable prediction rules, and con-
tinuity is often regarded as a necessary condition for computability (Brouwer’s
“continuity principle”).
Another difference of Stone’s definition is that compactness does not play any
special role in it (cf. the antecedent of (2)). It is easy to see that the condition
that {x1, x2, . . .} and {y1, y2, . . .} are precompact is essential in our framework.
Indeed, let us suppose, e.g., that {x1, x2, . . .} is allowed not to be precompact,
continuing to assume that X is a metric space and also assuming that Y is
a convex subset of a topological vector space. Reality can then choose xn,
n = 1, 2, . . ., as a discrete set inX ([15], 4.1.17). Let φn : X → [0, 1], n = 1, 2, . . .,
be continuous functions with disjoint supports such that φn(xn) = 1 for all n.
For any sequence of observations y1, y2, . . ., the function D(x) :=
∑
n φn(x)yn
is a continuous prediction rule such that D(xn) = yn for all n. Under such
circumstances it is impossible to compete with all continuous prediction rules
unless the loss function satisfies some very special properties.
As compared to competitive on-line prediction, the statistical setting is
rather restrictive. Compactness and continuity may be said to be satisfied au-
tomatically: under mild conditions, every measurable prediction rule can be
arbitrarily well approximated by a continuous one (according to Luzin’s the-
orem, [14], 7.5.2, combined with the Tietze–Uryson theorem, [15], 2.1.8), and
every probability measure is almost concentrated on a compact set (according
to Ulam’s theorem, [14], 7.1.4).
3 Defensive forecasting
In this and next sections we will discuss S-prediction and F-prediction, which
will prepare way for proving Theorems 1 and 2.
Remark 3 In this paper, S-predictions and F-predictions will always be proba-
bility measures, whereas typical D-predictions are not measures. This difference
is, however, accidental: e.g., in the problem of on-line regression (as in [48], Sec-
tion 5) different kinds of predictions are objects of the same nature.
Testing predictions in measure-theoretic probability and
neutral measures
S-predictions are empirical statements about the future; they may turn out true
or false as the time passes. For such statements to be non-vacuous, we need to
have a clear idea of when they become falsified by future observations [33]. In
principle, the issuer of S-predictions should agree in advance to a protocol of
testing his predictions. It can be said that such a protocol provides an empirical
meaning to the predictions.
Testing is, of course, a well-developed area of statistics (see, e.g., [10], Chap-
ter 3). A typical problem is: given a probability measure (the “null hypothesis”)
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P on a set Ω, which observations ω ∈ Ω falsify P? In the context of this paper,
P is an S-prediction, or, as we will often say, a probability forecast for ω ∈ Ω.
Developing Kolmogorov’s ideas (see, e.g., [22], Section 4, [23], and [24]), Martin-
Lo¨f (1966, [27]) defines a (in some sense, “the”) universal statistical test for a
computable P . Levin (1976, [26]) modifies Martin-Lo¨f’s definition of statistical
test (which was, in essence, the standard statistical definition) and extends it to
noncomputable P ; Levin’s 1976 definition is “uniform”, in an important sense.
Levin’s test is a function t : Ω × P(Ω) → [0,∞], where P(Ω) is the set of
all Borel probability measures on Ω, assumed to be a topological space. Levin
[26] considers the case Ω = {0, 1}∞ but notes that his argument works for any
other “good” compact space with a countable base. We will assume that Ω is a
metric compact (which is equivalent to Levin’s assumption that Ω is a compact
space with a countable base, [15], 4.2.8), endowing P(Ω) with the topology
of weak convergence (see below for references). Let us say that a function
t : Ω×P(Ω)→ [0,∞] is a test of randomness if it is lower semicontinuous and,
for all P ∈ P(Ω), ∫
Ω
t(ω, P )P (dω) ≤ 1.
The intuition behind this definition is that if we first choose a test t, then
observe ω, and then find that t(ω, P ) is very large for the observed ω, we are
entitled to reject the hypothesis that ω was generated from P (notice that the
P -probability that t(ω, P ) ≥ C cannot exceed 1/C, for any C > 0).
The following fundamental result is due to Levin ([26], footnote (1)), although
our proof is slightly different (for details of Levin’s proof, see [17], Section 5).
Lemma 1 (Levin) Let Ω be a metric compact. For any test of randomness t
there exists a probability measure P such that
∀ω ∈ Ω : t(ω, P ) ≤ 1. (4)
Before proving this result, let us recall some useful facts about the probability
measures on the metric compact Ω. The Banach space of all continuous func-
tions on Ω with the usual pointwise addition and scalar action and the sup norm
will be denoted C(Ω). By one of the Riesz representation theorems ([14], 7.4.1;
see also 7.1.1), the mapping µ 7→ Iµ, where Iµ(f) :=
∫
Ω f dµ, is a linear isometry
between the set of all finite Borel measures µ on Ω with the total variation norm
and the dual space C′(Ω) to C(Ω) with the standard dual norm ([34], Chapter
4). We will identify the finite Borel measures µ on Ω with the corresponding
Iµ ∈ C′(Ω). This makes P(Ω) a convex closed subset of C′(Ω).
We will be interested, however, in a different topology on C′(Ω), the weakest
topology for which all evaluation functionals µ ∈ C′(Ω) 7→ µ(f), f ∈ C(Ω), are
continuous. This topology is known as the weak∗ topology ([34], 3.14), and
the topology inherited by P(Ω) is known as the topology of weak convergence
([6], Appendix III). The point mass δω, ω ∈ Ω, is defined to be the probability
measure concentrated at ω, δω({ω}) = 1. The simple example of a sequence
of point masses δωn such that ωn → ω as n → ∞ and ωn 6= ω for all n shows
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that the topology of weak convergence is different from the dual norm topology:
δωn → δω holds in one but does not hold in the other.
It is not difficult to check that P(Ω) remains a closed subset of C′(Ω) in the
weak∗ topology ([7], III.2.7, Proposition 7). By the Banach–Alaoglu theorem
([34], 3.15) P(Ω) is compact in the topology of weak convergence (this is a
special case of Prokhorov’s theorem, [6], Appendix III, Theorem 6). In the rest
of this paper, P(Ω) (and all other spaces of probability measures) are always
equipped with the topology of weak convergence.
Since Ω is a metric compact, P(Ω) is also metrizable (by the well-known
Prokhorov metric: [6], Appendix III, Theorem 6).
Proof of Lemma 1: If t takes value ∞, redefine it as t := min(t, 2). For all
P,Q ∈ P(Ω) set
φ(Q,P ) :=
∫
Ω
t(ω, P )Q(dω).
The function φ(Q,P ) is linear in its first argument, Q, and lower semicontinuous
(see Lemma 2 below) in its second argument, P . Ky Fan’s minimax theorem
(see, e.g., [2], Theorem 11.4; remember that P(Ω) is a compact convex subset
of C′(Ω) equipped with the weak∗ topology) shows that there exists P ∗ ∈ P(Ω)
such that
∀Q ∈ P(Ω) : φ(Q,P ∗) ≤ sup
P∈P(Ω)
φ(P, P ).
Therefore,
∀Q ∈ P(Ω) :
∫
Ω
t(ω, P ∗)Q(dω) ≤ 1,
and we can see that t(ω, P ∗) never exceeds 1.
This proof used the following topological lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose F : X × Y → R is a non-negative lower semicontinuous
function defined on the product of two metric compacts, X and Y . If Q is a
probability measure on Y , the function x ∈ X 7→ ∫Y F (x, y)Q(dy) is also lower
semicontinuous.
Proof The product X × Y is also a metric compact ([15], 3.2.4 and 4.2.2).
According to Hahn’s theorem ([15], Problem 1.7.15(c)), there exists a non-
decreasing sequence of (non-negative) continuous functions Fn(x, y) such that
Fn(x, y) → F (x, y) as n → ∞ for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y . Since each Fn is uni-
formly continuous ([15], 4.3.32), the functions
∫
Y Fn(x, y)Q(dy) are continu-
ous, and by the monotone convergence theorem ([14], 4.3.2) they converge to∫
Y F (x, y)Q(dy). Therefore, again by Hahn’s theorem,
∫
Y F (x, y)Q(dy) is lower
semicontinuous.
Lemma 1 says that for any test of randomness t there is a probability forecast
P such that t never detects any disagreement between P and the outcome ω,
whatever ω might be.
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Gacs ([17], Section 3) defines a uniform test of randomness as a test of
randomness that is lower semicomputable (lower semicomputability is an “ef-
fective” version of the requirement of lower semicontinuity; this requirement is
very natural in the context of randomness: cf. [51], Section 3.1). He proves
([17], Theorem 1) that there exists a universal (i.e., largest to within a constant
factor) uniform test of randomness. If t(ω, P ) < ∞ for a fixed universal test t,
ω is said to be random with respect to P . Applied to the universal test, Lemma
1 says that there exists a “neutral” probability measure P , such that every ω is
random with respect to P .
Gacs ([17], Theorem 7) shows that under his definition there are no neu-
tral measures that are computable even in the weak sense of upper or lower
semicomputability even for Ω the compactified set of natural numbers. Levin’s
original definition of a uniform test of randomness involved some extra con-
ditions, which somewhat mitigate (but not solve completely) the problem of
non-computability.
Testing predictions in game-theoretic probability
There is an obvious mismatch between the dynamic prediction protocol of Sec-
tion 2 and the one-step probability forecasting setting of the previous subsection.
If we still want to fit the former into the latter, perhaps we will have to take the
infinite sequence of data and observations, x1, y1, x2, y2, . . ., as ω, and so take
Ω := (X×Y)∞. To find a probability measure satisfying a useful property, such
as (4) for an interesting t, might be computationally expensive. Besides, this
would force us to assume that the xns are also generated from P , and it would
be preferable to keep them free of any probabilities (we cannot assume that xn
are given constants since they, e.g., may depend on the previous observations).
A more convenient framework is provided by the game-theoretic foundations
of probability. This framework was first thoroughly explored by von Mises [29,
30] (see [37], Chapter 2, for von Mises’s precursors), and a serious shortcoming
of von Mises’s theory was corrected by Ville [44]. After Ville, game-theoretic
probability was dormant before being taken up by Kolmogorov [23, 24]. The
independence of game-theoretic probability from the standard measure-theoretic
probability [21] was emphasized by Dawid (cf. his prequential principle in [11,
13]); see [37] for a review.
There is a special player in the game-theoretic protocols who is responsible
for testing the forecasts; following [37], this player will be called Skeptic. This
is the protocol that we will be using in this paper:
Testing protocol
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Reality announces xn ∈ X.
Forecaster announces Pn ∈ P(Y).
Skeptic announces fn : Y → R such that
∫
Y
fn dPn ≤ 0.
Reality announces yn ∈ Y.
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Kn := Kn−1 + fn(yn).
END FOR.
Skeptic’s move fn can be interpreted as taking a long position in a security
that pays fn(yn) after yn becomes known; according to Forecaster’s beliefs en-
capsulated in Pn, Skeptic does not have to pay anything for this. We write∫
Y
fn dPn ≤ 0 to mean that
∫
Y
fn dPn exists and is non-positive. Skeptic starts
from some initial capital K0, which is not specified in the protocol; the evolution
of Kn, however, is described.
A game-theoretic procedure of testing Forecaster’s performance is a strategy
for Skeptic in the testing protocol. If Skeptic starts from K0 := 1, plays so that
he never risks bankruptcy (we say that he risks bankruptcy if his move fn makes
it possible for Reality to choose yn making Kn negative), and ends up with a
very large value KN of his capital, we are entitled to reject the forecasts as false.
Informally, the role of Skeptic is to detect disagreement between the forecasts
and the actual observations, and the current size of his capital tells us how
successful he is at achieving this goal.
Defensive forecasting
Levin’s Lemma 1 can be applied to any testing procedure t (test of randomness)
to produce forecasts that are ideal as far as that testing procedure is concerned.
Such ideal forecasts will be called “defensive forecasts”; in this subsection we
will be discussing a similar procedure of defensive forecasting in game-theoretic
probability.
Let us now slightly change the testing protocol: suppose that right after
Reality’s first move in each round Skeptic announces his strategy for the rest of
that round.
Defensive forecasting protocol
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Reality announces xn ∈ X.
Skeptic announces a lower semicontinuous Fn : Y × P(Y)→ R
such that
∫
Y
Fn(y, P )P (dy) ≤ 0 for all P ∈ P(Y).
Forecaster announces Pn ∈ P(Y).
Reality announces yn ∈ Y.
Kn := Kn−1 + Fn(yn, Pn).
END FOR.
This protocol will be used in the situation where Skeptic has chosen in advance,
and told Forecaster about, his testing strategy. However, the game-theoretic
analogue of Levin’s lemma holds even when Skeptic’s strategy is disclosed in a
piecemeal manner, as in our protocol.
The following lemma can be proven in the same way as (and is a simple corol-
lary of) Levin’s Lemma 1. Its version was first obtained by Akimichi Takemura
in 2004 [42].
Lemma 3 (Takemura) Let Y be a metric compact. In the defensive fore-
casting protocol, Forecaster can play in such a way that Skeptic’s capital never
increases, no matter how he and Reality play.
Proof For all P,Q ∈ P(Y) set
φ(Q,P ) :=
∫
Y
Fn(y, P )Q(dy),
where Fn is Skeptic’s move in round n. The function φ(Q,P ) is linear in Q
and lower semicontinuous in P (the latter also follows from Lemma 2 if we
notice that the assumption that F is non-negative can be removed: every lower
semicontinuous function on a compact set is bounded below). Ky Fan’s minimax
theorem shows that there exists P ∗ such that
φ(Q,P ∗) ≤ sup
P∈P(Y)
φ(P, P ) ≤ 0,
and we can see that Fn(y, P
∗) is always non-positive. Since the increment
Kn −Kn−1 equals Fn(yn, Pn), it suffices to set Pn := P ∗.
Testing and laws of probability
There are many interesting ways of testing probability forecasts. In fact, every
law of probability provides a way of testing probability forecasts (and vice versa,
any way of testing probability forecasts can be regarded as a law of probability).
As a simple example, consider the strong law of large numbers in the binary
case (Y = {0, 1}):
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=1
(yn − pn) = 0 (5)
with probability one, where pn := Pn({1}) is the predicted probability that
yn = 1. If (5) is violated, we are justified in rejecting the forecasts pn; in this
sense the strong law of large numbers can serve as a test.
In game-theoretic probability theory, the binary strong law of large numbers
is stated as follows: Skeptic has a strategy that, when started with K0 := 1,
never risks bankruptcy and makes Skeptic infinitely rich when (5) is violated.
We prove many such game-theoretic laws of probability in [37]; all of them
exhibit strategies (continuous or easily made continuous) for Skeptic that make
him rich when some property of agreement (such as, apart from various laws of
large numbers, the law of the iterated logarithm and the central limit theorem)
between the forecasts and the actual observations is violated. When Forecaster
plays the strategy of defensive forecasting against such a strategy for Skeptic,
the property of agreement is guaranteed to be satisfied, no matter how Reality
plays.
In the next section we will apply the procedure of defensive forecasting to
a law of large numbers found by Kolmogorov in 1929 ([20]; its simple game-
theoretic version can be found in [37], Lemma 6.1 and Proposition 6.1).
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4 Calibration and resolution
In this section we will see how the idea of defensive forecasting can be used
for producing F-predictions. It is interesting that the pioneering work in this
direction by Foster and Vohra [16] was completely independent of Levin’s idea.
The following is our basic probability forecasting protocol (more basic than the
protocols of the previous section).
Probability forecasting protocol
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Reality announces xn ∈ X.
Forecaster announces Pn ∈ P(Y).
Reality announces yn ∈ Y.
END FOR.
Forecaster’s prediction Pn is a probability measure on Y that, intuitively, de-
scribes his beliefs about the likely values of yn. Forecaster’s strategy in this
protocol will be called a probability forecasting strategy (or algorithm).
Asymptotic theory of calibration and resolution
The following is a simple asymptotic result about the possibility to ensure “cal-
ibration” and “resolution”.
Theorem 3 Suppose X and Y are locally compact metric spaces. There is a
probability forecasting strategy that guarantees
({x1, x2, . . .} and {y1, y2, . . .} are precompact)
=⇒ lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=1
(
f (xn, Pn, yn)−
∫
Y
f (xn, Pn, y)Pn(dy)
)
= 0 (6)
for all continuous functions f : X× P(Y)×Y → R.
This theorem will be proven at the end of this section, and in the rest of
this subsection I will explain the intuition behind (6). The discussion here is
an extension of that in [47], Section 6. Let us assume, for simplicity, that X
and Y are compact metric spaces; as before, δy, where y ∈ Y, stands for the
probability measure in P(Y) concentrated on {y}.
We start from the intuitive notion of calibration (for further details, see [13]
and [16]). The probability forecasts Pn, n = 1, . . . , N , are said to be “well
calibrated” (or “unbiased in the small”, or “reliable”, or “valid”) if, for any
P ∗ ∈ P(Y), ∑
n=1,...,N :Pn≈P∗
δyn∑
n=1,...,N :Pn≈P∗
1
≈ P ∗ (7)
13
provided
∑
n=1,...,N :Pn≈P∗
1 is not too small. The interpretation of (7) is that
the forecasts should be in agreement with the observed frequencies. We can
rewrite (7) as ∑
n=1,...,N :Pn≈P∗
(δyn − Pn)∑
n=1,...,N :Pn≈P∗
1
≈ 0.
Assuming that Pn ≈ P ∗ for a significant fraction of the n = 1, . . . , N , we can
further restate this as the requirement that
1
N
∑
n=1,...,N :Pn≈P∗
(
g(yn)−
∫
Y
g(y)Pn(dy)
)
≈ 0 (8)
for a wide range of continuous functions g (cf. the definition of the topology of
weak convergence in the previous section).
The fact that good calibration is only a necessary condition for good fore-
casting performance can be seen from the following standard example [13, 16]:
if Y = {0, 1} and
(y1, y2, y3, y4, . . .) = (1, 0, 1, 0, . . .),
the forecasts Pn({0}) = Pn({1}) = 1/2, n = 1, 2, . . ., are well calibrated but
rather poor; it would be better to forecast with
(P1, P2, P3, P4, . . .) = (δ1, δ0, δ1, δ0, . . .).
Assuming that each datum xn contains the information about the parity of n
(which can always be added to xn), we can see that the problem with the former
forecasting strategy is its lack of resolution: it does not distinguish between the
data with odd and even n. In general, we would like each forecast Pn to be
as specific as possible to the current datum xn; the resolution of a probability
forecasting algorithm is the degree to which it achieves this goal (taking it for
granted that xn contains all relevant information).
Analogously to (8), the forecasts Pn, n = 1, . . . , N , may be said to have good
resolution if, for any x∗ ∈ X,
1
N
∑
n=1,...,N :xn≈x∗
(
g(yn)−
∫
Y
g(y)Pn(dy)
)
≈ 0 (9)
for a wide range of continuous g. We can also require that the forecasts Pn,
n = 1, . . . , N , should have good “calibration-cum-resolution”: for any (x∗, P ∗) ∈
X× P(Y),
1
N
∑
n=1,...,N :(xn,Pn)≈(x∗,P∗)
(
g(yn)−
∫
Y
g(y)Pn(dy)
)
≈ 0 (10)
for a wide range of continuous g. Notice that even if forecasts have both good cal-
ibration and good resolution, they can still have poor calibration-cum-resolution.
To make sense of the ≈ in, say, (8), we can replace each “crisp” point P ∗ ∈
P(Y) by a “fuzzy point” IP∗ : P(Y)→ [0, 1]; IP∗ is required to be continuous,
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and we might also want to have IP∗(P
∗) = 1 and IP∗(P ) = 0 for all P outside a
small neighborhood of P ∗. (The alternative of choosing IP∗ := IA, where A is a
small neighborhood of P ∗ and IA is its indicator function, does not work because
of Oakes’s and Dawid’s examples [32, 12]; IP∗ can, however, be arbitrarily close
to IA.) This transforms (8) into
1
N
N∑
n=1
IP∗(Pn)
(
g(yn)−
∫
Y
g(y)Pn(dy)
)
≈ 0,
which is equivalent to
1
N
N∑
n=1
(
f(Pn, yn)−
∫
Y
f(Pn, y)Pn(dy)
)
≈ 0, (11)
where f(P, y) := IP∗(P )g(y). It is natural to require that (11) should hold
for a wide range of continuous functions f(P, y), not necessarily of the form
IP∗(P )g(y).
In the same way we can transform (9) into
1
N
N∑
n=1
(
f(xn, yn)−
∫
Y
f(xn, y)Pn(dy)
)
≈ 0
and (10) into
1
N
N∑
n=1
(
f(xn, Pn, yn)−
∫
Y
f(xn, Pn, y)Pn(dy)
)
≈ 0.
We can see that the consequent of (6) can be interpreted as the forecasts having
good calibration-cum-resolution; the case where f(x, P, y) depends only on P
and y corresponds to good calibration, and the case where f(x, P, y) depends
only on x and y corresponds to good resolution.
Calibration-cum-resolution bounds
A more explicit result about calibration and resolution is given in terms of
“reproducing kernel Hilbert spaces”. Let F be a Hilbert space of functions
on a set Ω (with the pointwise operations of addition and scalar action). Its
imbedding constant cF is defined by
cF := sup
ω∈Ω
sup
f∈F :‖f‖
F
≤1
f(ω). (12)
We will be interested in the case cF < ∞ and will refer to F satisfying this
condition as reproducing kernel Hilbert spaces (RKHS) with finite imbedding
constant.
The Hilbert space F is called a reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS)
if all evaluation functionals f ∈ F 7→ f(ω), ω ∈ Ω, are bounded; the class of
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RKHS with finite imbedding constant is a subclass of the class of RKHS. Let F
be an RKHS on Ω. By the Riesz–Fischer theorem, for each ω ∈ Ω there exists
a function kω ∈ F (the representer of ω in F) such that
f(ω) = 〈kω , f〉F , ∀f ∈ F . (13)
If Ω is a topological space and the mapping ω 7→ kω is continuous, F is called
a continuous RKHS. If Ω = X × P(Y) × Y and kω = kx,P,y is a continuous
function of (P, y) ∈ P(Y) ×Y for each x ∈ X, we will say that F is forecast-
continuous.
Theorem 4 Let Y be a metric compact and F be a forecast-continuous RKHS
on X × P(Y) × Y with finite imbedding constant cF . There is a probability
forecasting strategy that guarantees∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
n=1
(
f (xn, Pn, yn)−
∫
Y
f (xn, Pn, y)Pn(dy)
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2cF ‖f‖F
√
N
for all N and all f ∈ F .
Before proving Theorem 4 we will give an example of a convenient RKHS
F that can be used in its applications. Let us consider a finite Y, represent
P(Y) as a simplex in a Euclidean space, and suppose that X is a bounded open
subset of a Euclidean space. The interior IntP(Y) of P(Y) can be regarded as a
bounded open subset of a Euclidean space, and so the product X×IntP(Y)×Y
can also be regarded as a bounded open set Ω in a Euclidean space of dimension
K := dimX+ |Y| − 1: namely, as a disjoint union of |Y| copies of the bounded
open set X× IntP(Y).
For a smooth function u : Ω→ R and m ∈ {0, 1, . . .} define
‖u‖m :=
√√√√ ∑
0≤|α|≤m
∫
Ω
(Dαu)
2
, (14)
where
∫
Ω
stands for the integral with respect to the Lebesgue measure on Ω, α
runs over the multi-indices α = (α1, . . . , αK) ∈ {0, 1, . . .}K , and
|α| := α1 + · · ·+ αK , Dαu := ∂
|α|u
∂α1t1 · · ·∂αKtK
((t1, . . . , tK) is a typical point of the Euclidean space containing Ω). Let H
m(Ω)
be the completion of the set of smooth function on Ω with respect to the norm
(14). According to the Sobolev imbedding theorem ([1], Theorem 4.12), Hm(Ω)
can be identified with an RKHS of continuous functions on the closure Ω of Ω
with a finite imbedding constant. This conclusion depends on the assumption
m > K/2, which we will always be making.
It is clear that every continuous function f on Ω can be approximated,
arbitrarily closely, by a function from Hm(Ω): even the functions in C∞(RK),
all of which belong to all Sobolev spaces on Ω, are dense in C(Ω) ([1], 2.29).
16
There is little doubt that Sobolev spaces Hm(Ω) are continuous under our
assumption m > K/2 and for “nice” Ω, although I am not aware of any general
results in this direction.
Proof of Theorem 4
If f : Ω→ H is a function taking values in a topological vector space H and P
is a finite measure on its domain Ω, the integral
∫
Ω f dP will be understood in
Pettis’s ([34], Definition 3.26) sense. Namely, the integral
∫
Ω
f dP is defined to
be h ∈ H such that
Λh =
∫
Ω
(Λf) dP (15)
for all Λ ∈ H∗. The existence and uniqueness of the Pettis integral is assured if
Ω is a compact topological space (with P defined on its Borel σ-algebra), H is
a Banach space, and f is continuous ([34], Theorems 3.27, 3.20, and 3.3).
Remark 4 Another popular notion of the integral for vector-valued functions is
Bochner’s (see, e.g., [53]), which is more restrictive than Pettis’s (in particular,
the Bochner integral always satisfies (15)). Interestingly, the Bochner integral∫
Ω f dP exists for all measurable functions f : Ω → H (with Ω a measurable
space) provided H is a separable Banach space and ∫
Ω
‖f‖H dP < ∞ (this
follows from Bochner’s theorem, [53], Theorem 1 in Section V.5, and Pettis’s
measurability theorem, [53], the theorem in Section V.4). No topological condi-
tions are imposed on Ω or f , but there is the requirement of separability (which
is essential, again by Bochner’s theorem and Pettis’s measurability theorem).
This requirement, however, may be said to be satisfied automatically under the
given sufficient conditions for the existence of the Pettis integral: since f(Ω) is
a compact metric space, it is separable ([15], 4.1.18), and we can redefine H as
the smallest closed linear subspace containing f(Ω). Therefore, we can use all
properties of the Bochner integral under those conditions.
We start from a corollary (a version of Kolmogorov’s 1929 result) of Lemma
3.
Lemma 4 Suppose Y is a metric compact. Let Φn : X × P(Y) × Y → H,
n = 1, 2, . . ., be functions taking values in a Hilbert space H such that, for all n
and x, Φn(x, P, y) is a continuous function of (P, y) ∈ P(Y) × Y. There is a
probability forecasting strategy that guarantees
∥∥∥∥∥
N∑
n=1
Ψn (xn, Pn, yn)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
H
≤
N∑
n=1
‖Ψn (xn, Pn, yn)‖2H (16)
for all N , where
Ψn (x, P, y) := Φn (x, P, y) −
∫
Y
Φn (x, P, y)P (dy).
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Proof According to Lemma 3, it suffices to check that
SN :=
∥∥∥∥∥
N∑
n=1
Ψn (xn, Pn, yn)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
H
−
N∑
n=1
‖Ψn (xn, Pn, yn)‖2H (17)
is the capital process of some strategy for Skeptic in the defensive forecasting
protocol. Since
SN − SN−1 =
∥∥∥∥∥
N−1∑
n=1
Ψn (xn, Pn, yn) + ΨN (xN , PN , yN )
∥∥∥∥∥
2
H
−
∥∥∥∥∥
N−1∑
n=1
Ψn (xn, Pn, yn)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
H
− ‖ΨN (xN , PN , yN)‖2H
=
〈
2
N−1∑
n=1
Ψn (xn, Pn, yn) ,ΨN (xN , PN , yN)
〉
H
= 〈A,ΨN (xN , PN , yN )〉H ,
where we have introduced the notationA for the element 2
∑N−1
n=1 Ψn (xn, Pn, yn)
of H known at the beginning of the Nth round, and, by the definition of the
Pettis integral,∫
Y
〈A,ΨN (xN , PN , y)〉H PN (dy) =
〈
A,
∫
Y
ΨN (xN , PN , y)PN (dy)
〉
H
= 0,
(18)
the difference SN −SN−1 coincides with Skeptic’s gain in the Nth round of the
testing protocol when he makes the valid move fN (y) := 〈A,ΨN (xN , PN , y)〉H.
It remains to check that FN (y, P ) := 〈A,ΨN (xN , P, y)〉H will be a valid move
in the defensive forecasting protocol, i.e., that the function FN is lower semi-
continuous; we will see that it is in fact continuous. By Lemma 5 below, the
function
∫
Y
ΦN (x, P, y)P (dy) is continuous in P ; therefore, the function ΨN
is continuous in (P, y). This implies that 〈A,ΨN (xN , P, y)〉H is a continuous
function of (P, y).
The proof of Lemma 4 used the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Suppose Y is a metric compact and Φ : P(Y) × Y → H is a
continuous mapping into a Hilbert space H. The mapping P ∈ P(Y) 7→∫
Y
Φ(P, y)P (dy) is also continuous.
Proof Let Pn → P as n→∞; our goal is to prove that
∫
Y
Φ(Pn, y)Pn(dy)→∫
Y
Φ(P, y)P (dy). We have:
∥∥∥∥
∫
Y
Φ(Pn, y)Pn(dy)−
∫
Y
Φ(P, y)P (dy)
∥∥∥∥
H
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≤
∥∥∥∥
∫
Y
Φ(Pn, y)Pn(dy)−
∫
Y
Φ(P, y)Pn(dy)
∥∥∥∥
H
+
∥∥∥∥
∫
Y
Φ(P, y)Pn(dy)−
∫
Y
Φ(P, y)P (dy)
∥∥∥∥
H
. (19)
The first addend on the right-hand side can be bounded above by∫
Y
‖Φ(Pn, y)− Φ(P, y)‖H Pn(dy)
([34], 3.29), and the last expression tends to zero since Φ is uniformly continuous
([15], 4.3.32). The second addend on the right-hand side of (19) tends to zero
by the continuity of the mapping Q ∈ P(Y) 7→ ∫
Y
f(y)Q(dy) for a continuous
f ([7], III.4.2, Proposition 6).
The following variation on Lemma 5 will be needed later.
Lemma 6 Suppose X and Y are metric compacts and Φ : X×P(Y)×Y → H
is a continuous mapping into a Hilbert space H. The mapping (x, P ) ∈ X ×
P(Y) 7→ ∫
Y
Φ(x, P, y)P (dy) is also continuous.
Proof Let xn → x and Pn → P as n→∞. To prove
∫
Y
Φ(xn, Pn, y)Pn(dy)→∫
Y
Φ(x, P, y)P (dy) we can use a similar argument to that in the previous lemma
applied to
∥∥∥∥
∫
Y
Φ(xn, Pn, y)Pn(dy)−
∫
Y
Φ(x, P, y)P (dy)
∥∥∥∥
H
≤
∥∥∥∥
∫
Y
Φ(xn, Pn, y)Pn(dy)−
∫
Y
Φ(x, P, y)Pn(dy)
∥∥∥∥
H
+
∥∥∥∥
∫
Y
Φ(x, P, y)Pn(dy)−
∫
Y
Φ(x, P, y)P (dy)
∥∥∥∥
H
.
Now we can begin the actual proof of Theorem 4. Take as Φ(x, P, y) the
representer kx,P,y of the evaluation functional f ∈ F 7→ f(x, P, y):
〈f,kx,P,y〉F = f(x, P, y), ∀(x, P, y) ∈ X× P(Y)×Y, f ∈ F .
Set
kx,P :=
∫
Y
kx,P,yP (dy);
the function kx,P is continuous in P by Lemma 5.
Theorem 4 will easily follow from the following lemma, which itself is an
easy implication of Lemma 4.
Lemma 7 Let Y be a metric compact and F be a forecast-continuous RKHS
on X× P(Y)×Y. There is a probability forecasting strategy that guarantees
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∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
n=1
(
f (xn, Pn, yn)−
∫
Y
f (xn, Pn, y)Pn(dy)
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ‖f‖F
√√√√ N∑
n=1
‖kxn,Pn,yn − kxn,Pn‖2F
for all N and all f ∈ F .
Proof Using Lemma 4 (with all Ψn equal, Ψn(x, P, y) := kx,P,y − kx,P ), we
obtain:∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
n=1
(
f (xn, Pn, yn)−
∫
Y
f (xn, Pn, y)Pn(dy)
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
n=1
(
〈f,kxn,Pn,yn〉F −
∫
Y
〈f,kxn,Pn,y〉F Pn(dy)
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
〈
f,
N∑
n=1
(kxn,Pn,yn − kxn,Pn)
〉
F
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖f‖F
∥∥∥∥∥
N∑
n=1
(kxn,Pn,yn − kxn,Pn)
∥∥∥∥∥
F
≤ ‖f‖F
√√√√ N∑
n=1
‖kxn,Pn,yn − kxn,Pn‖2F .
Remark 5 The algorithm of Lemma 7 is a generalization of the K29 algorithm
of [50]. It would be interesting also to analyze the K29∗ algorithm (called the
algorithm of large numbers in [47] and [46]).
To deduce Theorem 4 from Lemma 7, notice that ‖kx,P,y‖F ≤ cF (by Lemma
8 below), ‖kx,P ‖F ≤
∫
Y
‖kx,P,y‖F P (dy) ≤ cF , and, therefore,
N∑
n=1
‖kxn,Pn,yn − kxn,Pn‖2F ≤ 4c2FN.
This completes the proof apart from Lemma 8.
Let F be an RKHS on Ω. The norm of the evaluation functional f ∈ F 7→
f(ω) will be denoted by cF (ω). It is clear that F is an RKHS with finite
imbedding constant if and only if
cF := sup
ω∈Ω
cF (ω) (20)
is finite; the constants in (20) and (12) coincide. The next lemma, concluding
the proof of Theorem 4, asserts that the norm ‖kω‖F of the representer of ω in
F coincides with the norm cF (ω) of the evaluation functional f 7→ f(ω).
Lemma 8 Let F be an RKHS on Ω. For each ω ∈ Ω,
‖kω‖F = cF (ω). (21)
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Proof Fix ω ∈ Ω. We are required to prove
sup
f :‖f‖
F
≤1
|f(ω)| = ‖kω‖F .
The inequality ≤ follows from
|f(ω)| = |〈f,kω〉F | ≤ ‖f‖F ‖kω‖F ≤ ‖kω‖F ,
where ‖f‖F ≤ 1. The inequality ≥ follows from
|f(ω)| = kω(ω)‖kω‖F
=
〈kω,kω〉F
‖kω‖F
= ‖kω‖F ,
where f := kω/ ‖kω‖F and ‖kω‖F is assumed to be non-zero (if it is zero,
kω = 0, which implies cF (ω) = 0, and (21) still holds).
Reproducing kernels
In this subsection we start preparations for proving Theorem 3. But first we
need to delve slightly deeper into the theory of RKHS. An equivalent language
for talking about RKHS is provided by the notion of a reproducing kernel,
and this subsection defines reproducing kernels and summarizes some of their
properties. For a detailed discussion, see, e.g., [3, 4] or [28].
The reproducing kernel of an RKHS F on Ω is the function k : Ω2 → R
defined by
k(ω, ω′) := 〈kω ,kω′〉F
(equivalently, we could define k(ω, ω′) as kω(ω
′) or as kω′(ω)). The origin of
this name is the “reproducing property” (13).
There is a simple internal characterization of reproducing kernels of RKHS.
First, it is easy to check that the function k(ω, ω′), as we defined it, is symmetric,
k(ω, ω′) = k(ω′, ω), ∀(ω, ω′) ∈ Ω2,
and positive definite,
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
titjk(ωi, ωj) ≥ 0,
∀m = 1, 2, . . . , (t1, . . . , tm) ∈ Rm, (ω1, . . . , ωm) ∈ Ωm.
On the other hand, for every symmetric and positive definite k : Ω2 → R there
exists a unique RKHS F on Ω such that k is the reproducing kernel of F ([3],
Theorem 2 on p. 143).
We can see that the notions of a reproducing kernel of RKHS and of a
symmetric positive definite function on Ω2 have the same content, and we will
sometimes say “kernel on Ω” to mean a symmetric positive definite function
on Ω2. Kernels in this sense are the main source of RKHS in learning theory:
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cf. [43, 35, 38]. Every kernel on X is a valid parameter for our prediction
algorithms. In general, it is convenient to use RKHS in stating mathematical
properties of prediction algorithms, but the algorithms themselves typically use
the more constructive representation of RKHS via their reproducing kernels.
It is easy to see that F is a continuous RKHS if and only if its reproducing
kernel is continuous (see [40] or [47], Appendix B of the arXiv technical report).
A convenient equivalent definition of cF is
cF = ck := sup
ω∈Ω
√
k(ω, ω) = sup
ω,ω′∈Ω
√
|k(ω, ω′)|, (22)
k being the reproducing kernel of an RKHS F on Ω.
Let us say that a family F of functions f : Ω → R is universal if Ω is a
topological space and for every compact subset A of Ω every continuous function
on A can be arbitrarily well approximated in the metric C(A) by functions in
F (in the case of compact Ω this coincides with the definition given in [40] as
Definition 4).
We have already noticed the obvious fact that the Sobolev spaces Hm(Ω)
on bounded open Ω ⊆ RK , K < 2m, are universal. There is a price to pay for
the obviousness of this fact: the reproducing kernels of the Sobolev spaces are
known only in some special cases (see, e.g., [5], Section 7.4). This complicates
checking their continuity.
On the other hand, some very simple continuous reproducing kernels, such
as the Gaussian kernel
k(ω, ω′) := exp
(
−‖ω − ω
′‖2
σ2
)
(‖·‖ being the Euclidean norm and σ being an arbitrary positive constant) on
the Euclidean space RK and the infinite polynomial kernel
k(ω, ω′) :=
1
1− 〈ω, ω′〉
(〈·, ·〉 being the Euclidean inner product) on the Euclidean ball {ω ∈ RK | ‖ω‖ <
1}, are universal ([40], Examples 1 and 2). Their universality is not difficult to
prove but not obvious (and even somewhat counterintuitive in the case of the
Gaussian kernel: a priori one might expect that only smooth functions that are
almost linear at scales smaller than σ can belong to the corresponding RKHS).
On the other hand, their continuity is obvious.
Universal function space on the Hilbert cube
Remember that the Hilbert cube is the topological space [0, 1]∞ ([15], 2.3.22),
i.e., the topological product of a countable number of closed intervals [0, 1].
As the next step in the proof of Theorem 3, in this subsection we construct a
universal RKHS on the Hilbert cube with finite imbedding constant; the idea
of the construction is to “mix” Sobolev spaces on [0, 1]K for K = 1, 2, . . . (or
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the spaces mentioned at the end of the previous subsection, for which both
continuity and universality are proven).
Let FK , K = 1, 2, . . ., be the set of all functions f on the Hilbert cube
such that f(t1, t2, . . .) depends only on t1, . . . , tK and whose norm (14) (with
Ω := [0, 1]K) is finite for m := K. Equipping FK with this norm we obtain an
RKHS with finite imbedding constant. Let cK be the imbedding constant of
FK . It will be convenient to modify each FK by scaling the inner product:
〈·, ·〉F ′
K
:= c2K2
K 〈·, ·〉FK ;
the scaled FK will be denoted F ′K . By (13), the representer k′ω of ω in F ′K can
be expressed as k′ω = c
−2
K 2
−Kkω via the representer kω of ω in FK . Therefore,
the imbedding constant of F ′K is 2−K/2, and it is obvious that F ′K inherits from
FK the property of being a universal RKHS for functions that only depend on
t1, . . . , tK .
For the reproducing kernel k′K(ω, ω
′) of F ′K we have
|k′K(ω, ω′)| =
∣∣∣〈k′ω,k′ω′〉F ′
K
∣∣∣ ≤ ‖k′ω‖F ′
K
‖k′ω′‖F ′
K
≤ 2−K/22−K/2 = 2−K ,
where k′ω and k
′
ω′ stand for the representers in F ′K . Define an RKHS GK as
the set of all functions f : [0, 1]∞ → R that can be decomposed into a sum
f = f1 + · · · + fK , where fk ∈ F ′k, k = 1, . . . ,K. The norm of f is defined as
the infimum
‖f‖GK := inf
√√√√ K∑
k=1
‖fk‖2F ′
k
over all such decompositions. According to the theorem on p. 353 of [4], GK is
an RKHS whose reproducing kernel kK satisfies
kK(ω, ω
′) =
K∑
k=1
k′k(ω, ω
′) ∈ [−1 + 2−K , 1− 2−K] .
The limiting RKHS of GK , K → ∞, is defined in [4], Section I.9 (Case B),
in two steps. Let F0 consist of the functions in GK , K = 1, 2, . . .; the F0-norm
of a function g ∈ GK is defined as
‖g‖F0 := infk≥K ‖g‖Gk .
In general, the space F0 is not complete. Therefore, a larger space F∗0 is defined:
f ∈ F∗0 if there is a Cauchy sequence fn in F0 such that
∀ω ∈ [0, 1]∞ : f(ω) = lim
n→∞
fn(ω); (23)
the norm of such an f is defined as
‖f‖F∗
0
:= inf lim
n→∞
‖fn‖F0 ,
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where the infimum is taken over all Cauchy sequences satisfying (23). By The-
orem II on p. 367 of [4], F∗0 is an RKHS with reproducing kernel
k∗(ω, ω′) =
∞∑
k=1
k′k(ω, ω
′) ∈ [−1, 1]; (24)
therefore, its imbedding constant is finite (at most 1: see (22)).
Lemma 9 The RKHS F∗0 on the Hilbert cube is universal and continuous.
Proof The Hilbert cube is a topological space that is both compact (by
Tikhonov’s theorem, [15], 3.2.4) and metrizable; for concreteness, let us fix
the metric
ρ ((t1, t2, . . .) , (t
′
1, t
′
2, . . .)) :=
∞∑
k=1
2−k |tk − t′k| .
Let f be a continuous function on the Hilbert cube. Since every continuous
function on a compact metric space is uniformly continuous ([15], 4.3.32), the
function
g (t1, t2, . . .) := f (t1, . . . , tK , 0, 0, . . .)
can be made arbitrarily close to f , in metric C([0, 1]∞), by makingK sufficiently
large. It remains to notice that g can be arbitrarily closely approximated by a
function in FK and that every function in FK belongs to F∗0 .
The continuity of F∗0 follows from the WeierstrassM -test and the expression
(24) of its reproducing kernel via the reproducing kernels of the spaces F ′K ,
K = 1, 2, . . ., with imbedding constant 2−K .
Corollary 1 For any compact metric space Ω there is a continuous universal
RKHS F on Ω with finite imbedding constant.
Proof It is known ([15], 4.2.10) that every compact metric space can be homeo-
morphically imbedded into the Hilbert cube; let F : Ω → [0, 1]∞ be such an
imbedding. The image F (Ω) is a compact subset of the Hilbert cube ([15],
3.1.10). Let F be the class of all functions f : Ω → R such that f(F−1) :
F (Ω) → R is the restriction of a function in F∗0 to F (Ω); the norm of f is
defined as the infimum of the norms of the extensions of f(F−1) to the whole of
the Hilbert cube. According to the theorem on p. 351 of [4], this function space
is an RKHS whose reproducing kernel is k(ω, ω′) := k∗(F (ω), F (ω′)), where k∗
is the reproducing kernel of F∗0 ; we can see that F is a continuous RKHS with
finite imbedding constant.
Let us see that the RKHS F is universal. Take any continuous function
g : Ω → R. By the Tietze–Uryson theorem ([15], 2.1.8), g(F−1) : F (Ω) → R
can be extended to a continuous function g1 on [0, 1]
∞. Let g2 ∈ F∗0 be a
function that is close to g1 in the C([0, 1]
∞) norm. Then g2(F ) : Ω → R will
belong to F and will be close to g in the C(Ω) norm.
24
Proof of Theorem 3
We start by proving the theorem under the assumption that X and Y are
compact metric spaces. As explained above, in this case P(Y) is also compact
and metrizable; therefore, Ω := X×P(Y)×Y is also compact and metrizable.
Let f be a continuous real-valued function on Ω; our goal is to establish the
consequent of (6).
Let F be a universal and continuous RKHS on Ω with finite imbedding
constant (cf. Corollary 1). If g ∈ F is at a distance at most ǫ from f in the
C(Ω) metric, we obtain from Theorem 4:
lim sup
N→∞
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
n=1
(
f (xn, Pn, yn)−
∫
Y
f (xn, Pn, y)Pn(dy)
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤ lim sup
N→∞
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
n=1
(
g (xn, Pn, yn)−
∫
Y
g (xn, Pn, y)Pn(dy)
)∣∣∣∣∣+ 2ǫ = 2ǫ. (25)
Since this can be done for any ǫ > 0, the proof for the case of compact X and
Y is complete.
The rest of the proof is based on the following game (an abstract version of
the “doubling trick”, [9]) played in a topological space X :
Game of removal G(X)
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Remover announces compact Kn ⊆ X .
Evader announces pn /∈ Kn.
END FOR.
Winner: Evader if the set {p1, p2, . . .} is precompact; Remover otherwise.
Intuitively, the goal of Evader is to avoid being removed to the infinity. With-
out loss of generality we will assume that Remover always announces a non-
decreasing sequence of compact sets: K1 ⊆ K2 ⊆ · · · .
Lemma 10 (Gruenhage) Remover has a winning strategy in G(X) if X is a
locally compact and paracompact space.
Proof We will follow the proof of Theorem 4.1 in [18] (the easy direction). If
X is locally compact and σ-compact, there exists a non-decreasing sequence
K1 ⊆ K2 ⊆ · · · of compact sets covering X , and each Kn can be extended
to compact K∗n so that IntK
∗
n ⊇ Kn ([15], 3.3.2). Remover will obviously win
G(X) choosing K∗1 ,K
∗
2 , . . . as his moves.
If X is the sum of locally compact σ-compact spaces Xs, s ∈ S, Remover
plays, for each s ∈ S, the strategy described in the previous paragraph on the
subsequence of Evader’s moves belonging to Xs. If Evader chooses pn ∈ Xs
for infinitely many Xs, those Xs will form an open cover of the closure of
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{p1, p2, . . .} without a finite subcover. If xn are chosen from only finitely many
Xs, there will be infinitely many xn chosen from some Xs, and the result of the
previous paragraph can be applied. It remains to remember that each locally
compact paracompact can be represented as the sum of locally compact σ-
compact subsets ([15], 5.1.27).
Now it is easy to prove the general theorem. Forecaster’s strategy ensuring
(6) will be constructed from his strategies S(A,B) ensuring the consequent of
(6) under the condition ∀n : (xn, yn) ∈ A × B for given compact sets A ⊆ X
and B ⊆ Y and from Remover’s winning strategy in G(X×Y) (remember that,
by Stone’s theorem, [15], 5.1.3, all metric space are paracompact and that the
product of two locally compact spaces is locally compact, [15], 3.3.13; therefore,
Lemma 10 is applicable to G(X × Y)). Without loss of generality we assume
that Remover’s moves are always of the form A × B for A ⊆ X and B ⊆ Y.
Forecaster will be playing two games in parallel: the probability forecasting
game and the auxiliary game of removal G(X×Y) (in the role of Evader).
Forecaster asks Remover to make his first move A1 × B1 in the game of
removal. He then plays the probability forecasting game using the strategy
S(A1, B1) until Reality chooses (xn, yn) /∈ A1 × B1 (forever if Reality never
chooses such (xn, yn)). As soon as such (xn, yn) is chosen, Forecaster, in his
Evader hat, announces (xn, yn) and notes Remover’s move (A2, B2). He then
plays the probability forecasting game using the strategy S(A2, B2) until Reality
chooses (xn, yn) /∈ A2 ×B2, etc.
Let us check that this strategy for Forecaster will always ensure (6). If Re-
ality chooses (xn, yn) outside Forecaster’s current Ak × Bk finitely often, the
consequent of (6) will be satisfied. If Reality chooses (xn, yn) outside Fore-
caster’s current Ak×Bk infinitely often, the set {(xn, yn) |n = 1, 2, . . .} will not
be precompact, and so the antecedent of (6) will be violated.
5 Implications for probability theory
This section is an aside; its results are not used in the rest of the paper.
As we discussed at the end of Section 3, the procedure of defensive forecasting
can be applied to virtually any law of probability (stated game-theoretically)
to obtain a probability forecasting strategy whose forecasts are guaranteed to
satisfy this law. Unfortunately, the standard laws of probability theory are often
not strong enough to produce interesting probability forecasting strategies ([50],
Section 4.1). In particular, for the purpose of this paper it would be easiest to
apply the procedure of defensive forecasting to a law of probability asserting
that (6) holds for all continuous functions f simultaneously with probability
one. I am not aware of such results, but in the derivation of Theorem 5 we
essentially proved one. In this section this result will be stated formally (as
Theorem 5).
In general, it can be hoped that probability theory and competitive on-line
prediction have a potential to enrich each other; not only laws of probability
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can be translated into probability forecasting strategies via defensive forecasting,
but also the needs of competitive on-line prediction can help identify and fill
gaps in the existing probability theory.
Game-theoretic result
Let us say that Skeptic can force some property E of the players’ moves
xn, Pn, yn, n = 1, 2, . . ., in the testing protocol if he has a strategy guaran-
teeing that (1) his capital Kn is always non-negative, and (2) either E is sat-
isfied or limn→∞Kn = ∞. The properties that can be forced by Skeptic are
the game-theoretic analogue of the properties that hold with probability one in
measure-theoretic probability theory ([37], Section 8.1).
The following is a corollary from the proof (rather than the statement, which
is why we also call it a theorem) of Theorem 3. Its interpretation is that the
true probabilities have good calibration-cum-resolution.
Theorem 5 Suppose X and Y are locally compact metric spaces. Skeptic can
force
({x1, x2, . . .} and {y1, y2, . . .} are precompact) =⇒(
∀f : lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=1
(
f (xn, Pn, yn)−
∫
Y
f (xn, Pn, y)Pn(dy)
)
= 0
)
(26)
in the testing protocol, where f ranges over all continuous functions f : X ×
P(Y)×Y → R.
Proof of Theorem 5
We will follow the proof of Theorem 3, starting from an analogue of Lemma 4.
Lemma 11 Suppose Y is a metric compact. Let Φ : X×P(Y)×Y → H be a
function taking values in a Hilbert space H such that, for each x, Φ(x, P, y) is a
continuous function of (P, y) ∈ P(Y)×Y. Suppose supx,P,y ‖Φ(x, P, y)‖H <∞
and set
Ψ(x, P, y) := Φ (x, P, y)−
∫
Y
Φ (x, P, y)P (dy).
Skeptic can force ∥∥∥∥∥
N∑
n=1
Ψ(xn, Pn, yn)
∥∥∥∥∥
H
= O
(√
N logN
)
(27)
as N →∞.
Proof Let
c := sup
x,P,y
‖Ψ(x, P, y)‖H <∞.
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For k,N = 1, 2, . . ., define
SkN :=
{
2k + SN if c
2N ≤ 2k
SkN−1 otherwise,
where SN is defined as in (17) (with Ψ in place of Ψn in all references to the
proof of Lemma 4). Let us check that
S∗N :=
∞∑
k=1
k−22−kSkN (28)
is a capital process (obviously non-negative) of a strategy for Skeptic started
with a finite initial capital. Since Sk0 = 2
k, the initial capital
∑∞
k=1 k
−2 = π2/6
is indeed finite. It is also easy to see that the series (28) is convergent and that
(18) still holds, where
A =
∞∑
k=K
k−22−k2
N−1∑
n=1
Ψ(xn, Pn, yn)
for some K.
Skeptic can force S∗N ≤ C, where C can depend on the path
x1, P1, y1, x2, P2, y2, . . .
chosen by the players (see Lemma 3.1 in [37] or, for a simpler argument, the
end of the proof of Theorem 3 in [49]). Therefore, he can force k−22−kSkN ≤ C
for all k. Setting k := ⌈log(c2N)⌉ (with log standing for the binary logarithm),
we can rewrite the inequality SkN ≤ Ck22k as
2k + SN ≤ Ck22k,
which implies
∥∥∥∥∥
N∑
n=1
Ψ(xn, Pn, yn)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
H
≤ Ck22k
≤ C (log(c2N) + 1)2 2log(c2N)+1 = O (N log2N) .
The following analogue of Theorem 4 immediately follows from Lemma 11
and the proof of Lemma 7.
Lemma 12 Let Y be a metric compact and F be a forecast-continuous RKHS
on X× P(Y)×Y with finite imbedding constant. Skeptic can force
N∑
n=1
(
f (xn, Pn, yn)−
∫
Y
f (xn, Pn, y)Pn(dy)
)
= O
(
‖f‖F
√
N logN
)
as N →∞, where the O is uniform in f ∈ F .
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In its turn Lemma 12 immediately implies the statement of Theorem 5 in the
case of compact X and Y (where the antecedent of (26) is automatically true):
we can use the same argument based on (25).
Now let X and Y be any locally compact metric spaces. Skeptic can use the
same method based on Remover’s winning strategy in the game of removal as
that used by Forecaster in the proof of Theorem 3 (see p. 26). This completes
the proof of Theorem 5.
Measure-theoretic result
In this subsection we will use some notions of measure-theoretic probability the-
ory, such as regular conditional distributions; all needed background information
can be found in, e.g., [39].
Corollary 2 Suppose Fn, n = 0, 1, . . ., is a filtration (increasing sequence of
σ-algebras), X and Y are compact metric spaces, xn, n = 1, 2, . . ., are Fn−1-
measurable random elements taking values in X, yn, n = 1, 2, . . ., are Fn-
measurable random elements taking values in Y, and Pn ∈ P(Y) are regular
conditional distributions of yn given Fn−1. Then
∀f : lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=1
(
f (xn, Pn, yn)−
∫
Y
f (xn, Pn, y)Pn(dy)
)
= 0 (29)
holds with probability one, where f ranges over all continuous functions f :
X× P(Y) ×Y → R.
Proof Since X and Y are automatically complete and separable, regular condi-
tional distributions exist by the corollary of Theorem II.7.5 in [39]. Our deriva-
tion of Corollary 2 from Theorem 5 will follow the standard recipe ([37], Section
8.1).
Skeptic’s strategy forcing (29) (i.e., the consequent of (26)) can be cho-
sen measurable (in the sense that fn(y) is a measurable function of y and
the previous moves x1, P1, y1, . . . , xn, Pn). This makes his capital process Kn,
n = 0, 1, . . ., a martingale (in the usual measure-theoretic sense) with respect
to the filtration (Fn). This martingale is non-negative and tends to infinity
where (29) fails; standard results of probability theory (such as Doob’s inequal-
ity, [39], Theorem VII.3.1.III, or Doob’s convergence theorem, [39], Theorem
VII.4.1) imply that (29) holds with probability one.
6 Defensive forecasting for decision making:
asymptotic theory
Our D-prediction algorithms are built on top of probability forecasting algo-
rithms: D-predictions are found by minimizing the expected loss, with the ex-
pectation taken with respect to the probability forecast. The first problem that
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we have to deal with is the possibility that the minimizer of the expected loss will
be a discontinuous function, whereas continuity is essential for the method of
defensive forecasting (cf. Theorem 3, where f has to be a continuous function).
Continuity of choice functions
It will be convenient to use the notation
λ(x, γ, P ) :=
∫
Y
λ(x, γ, y)P (dy),
where P is a probability measure on Y. Let us say that G : X× P(Y) → Γ is
a (precise) choice function if it satisfies
λ(x,G(x, P ), P ) = inf
γ∈Γ
λ(x, γ, P ), ∀x ∈ X, P ∈ P(Y).
As we said, a serious problem in implementing the expected loss minimization
principle is that there might not exist a continuous choice function G; this is true
even if X, Γ, and Y are metric compacts and the loss function is continuous.
If, however, the loss function λ(x, γ, y) is convex in γ ∈ Γ, there exists an
approximate choice function (although a precise choice function may still not
exist).
The simplest example of a prediction game is perhaps the simple prediction
game, in which there are no data, Γ = Y = {0, 1} and λ(γ, y) := |y − γ|
(omitting the xs from our notation). There are no continuous approximate
choice functions in this case, since there are no non-trivial (taking more than
one value) continuous functions from the connected space P(Y) to Γ. If we
allow randomized predictions, the simple prediction game effectively transforms
into the following absolute loss game: Γ = [0, 1], Y = {0, 1}, λ(γ, y) := |y − γ|.
Intuitively, the prediction γ in this game is the bias of the coin tossed to choose
the prediction in the simple prediction game, and |y − γ| is the expected loss in
the latter.
Unfortunately, there is still no continuous choice function in the absolute
loss game. It is easy to check that any choice function G must satisfy
G(P ) :=
{
1 if P ({1}) > 1/2
0 if P ({1}) < 1/2, (30)
but the case P ({1}) = 1/2 is a point of bifurcation: both predictions γ = 1 and
γ = 0 are optimal, as indeed is every prediction in between. If P ({1}) = 1/2,
the predictor finds himself in a position of Buridan’s ass: he has several equally
attractive decisions to choose from. It is clear that G defined by (30) cannot be
continuously extended to the whole of P({0, 1}).
We have to look for approximate choice functions. Under natural compact-
ness and convexity conditions, they exist by the following lemma.
Lemma 13 Let X be a paracompact, Y be a non-empty compact convex subset
of a topological vector space, and f : X × Y → R be a continuous function such
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that f(x, y) is convex in y ∈ Y for each x ∈ X. For any ǫ > 0 there exists a
continuous “approximate choice function” g : X → Y such that
∀x ∈ X : f(x, g(x)) ≤ inf
y∈Y
f(x, y) + ǫ. (31)
Proof Each (x, y) ∈ X×Y has a neighborhood Ax,y×Bx,y such that Ax,y and
Bx,y are open sets in X and Y , respectively, and
sup
Ax,y×Bx,y
f − inf
Ax,y×Bx,y
f <
ǫ
2
.
For each x ∈ X choose a finite subcover of the cover {Ax,y×Bx,y |x ∈ Ax,y, y ∈
Y } of {x} × Y and let Ax be the intersection of all Ax,y in this subcover. The
sets Ax constitute an open cover of X such that
(x1 ∈ Ax, x2 ∈ Ax) =⇒ |f(x1, y)− f(x2, y)| < ǫ
2
(32)
for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . Since X is paracompact, there exists ([15], Theorem
5.1.9) a locally finite partition {φi | i ∈ I} of unity subordinated to the open
cover of X formed by all Ax, x ∈ X . For each i ∈ I choose xi ∈ X such that
φi(xi) > 0 (without loss of generality we can assume that such xi exists for each
i ∈ I) and choose yi ∈ argminy f(xi, y). Now we can set
g(x) :=
∑
i∈I
φi(x)yi.
Inequality (31) follows, by (32) and the convexity of f(x, y) in y, from
∀y ∈ Y : f(x, g(x)) = f
(
x,
∑
i
φi(x)yi
)
≤
∑
i
φi(x)f (x, yi)
≤
∑
i
φi(x)f (xi, yi) +
ǫ
2
≤
∑
i
φi(x)f (xi, y) +
ǫ
2
≤
∑
i
φi(x)f (x, y) + ǫ = f(x, y) + ǫ,
where i ranges over the finite number of i ∈ I for which φi(x) is non-zero.
Suppose that X and Y are compact metric spaces, Γ is a compact convex
subset of a topological vector space, and λ(x, γ, y) is continuous in (x, γ, y) and
convex in γ ∈ Γ (therefore, by Lemma 6, λ(x, γ, P ) is continuous in (x, γ, P ) ∈
X × Γ × P(Y), and it is convex in γ). Taking X × P(Y) as X and Γ as Y ,
we can see that for each ǫ > 0 there exists an approximate choice function G
satisfying
λ(x,G(x, P ), P ) ≤ inf
γ∈Γ
λ(x, γ, P ) + ǫ, ∀x ∈ X, P ∈ P(Y). (33)
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Proof of a weak form of Theorem 1
Suppose X and Y are compact metric spaces and Γ is a compact convex subset
of a topological vector space. In this subsection we will prove the existence of a
prediction algorithm guaranteeing (2) (whose antecedent can now be ignored)
with ≤ 0 replaced by ≤ ǫ for all continuous prediction rules D for an arbitrarily
small constant ǫ > 0. Let G satisfy (33). If Predictor chooses his predictions by
applying the approximate choice function G to xn and probability forecasts Pn
for yn satisfying (6) of Theorem 3, we will have
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, γn, yn) =
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, G(xn, Pn), yn)
=
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, G(xn, Pn), Pn) +
N∑
n=1
(
λ(xn, G(xn, Pn), yn)− λ(xn, G(xn, Pn), Pn)
)
=
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, G(xn, Pn), Pn) + o(N) ≤
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, D(xn), Pn) + ǫN + o(N)
=
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, D(xn), yn)−
N∑
n=1
(
λ(xn, D(xn), yn)−λ(xn, D(xn), Pn)
)
+ǫN+o(N)
=
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, D(xn), yn) + ǫN + o(N). (34)
7 Defensive forecasting for decision making:
loss bounds
The goal of this section is to finish the proof of Theorem 1 and to establish its
non-asymptotic version. We will start with the latter.
Results
Let F be an RKHS onX×Y with finite imbedding constant. For each prediction
rule D : X → Γ, define a function λD : X×Y → R by
λD(x, y) := λ(x,D(x), y).
The notation ‖f‖F will be used for all functions f : X × Y → R: we just
set ‖f‖F := ∞ for f /∈ F . We will continue to use the notation cF for the
imbedding constant (defined by (12), where Ω := X×Y). Set
cλ := sup
x∈X,γ∈Γ,y∈Y
λ(x, γ, y)− inf
x∈X,γ∈Γ,y∈Y
λ(x, γ, y);
this is finite if λ is continuous and X,Γ,Y are compact.
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Theorem 6 Suppose X and Y are compact metric spaces, Γ is a convex com-
pact subset of a topological vector space and the loss function λ(x, γ, y) is con-
tinuous in (x, γ, y) and convex in γ ∈ Γ. Let F be a forecast-continuous RKHS
on X × Y with finite imbedding constant cF . There is an on-line prediction
algorithm that guarantees
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, γn, yn) ≤
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, D(xn), yn) +
√
c2λ + 4c
2
F (‖λD‖F + 1)
√
N + 1
(35)
for all prediction rules D and all N = 1, 2, . . . .
An application of Hoeffding’s inequality immediately gives the following
corollary (we postpone the details of the simple proof until p. 37).
Corollary 3 Suppose X,Γ,Y are compact metric spaces and the loss function
λ is continuous. Let N ∈ {1, 2, . . .} and δ ∈ (0, 1). There is a randomized
on-line prediction algorithm achieving
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, gn, yn) ≤
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, dn, yn)
+
√
c2λ + 4c
2
F (‖λD‖F + 1)
√
N + cλ
√
2 ln
1
δ
√
N + 1
with probability at least 1 − δ for any randomized prediction rule D : X →
P(Γ); gn and dn are independent random variables distributed as γn and D(xn),
respectively.
The above results are non-vacuous only when λD is an element of the function
space F . If F is a Sobolev space, this condition follows from D being in the
Sobolev space and the smoothness of λ. For example, Moser proved in 1966 the
following result concerning composition in Sobolev spaces. Let Ω be a smooth
bounded domain in RK and m be an integer number satisfying 2m > K. If
u ∈ Hm(Ω) and Φ ∈ Cm(R), then Φ ◦ u ∈ Hm(Ω) (see [31]; for further results,
see [8]).
Two special cases of calibration-cum-resolution
In the chain (34) we applied the law of large numbers (the property of good
calibration-cum-resolution) twice: in the third and fifth equalities. It is easy
to see, however, that in fact the fifth equality depends only on resolution and
the third equality, although it depends on calibration-cum-resolution, involves
a known function f (in the notation of (6)). We will say that the fifth equality
depends on “general resolution” whereas the third equality depends on “specific
calibration-cum-resolution”. This limited character of the required calibration-
cum-resolution becomes important for obtaining good bounds on the predic-
tive performance: in the following subsections we will construct prediction al-
gorithms that satisfy the properties of specific calibration-cum-resolution and
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general resolution and merge them into one algorithm; we will start from the
last step.
Synthesis of prediction algorithms
The following corollary of Lemma 4 will allow us to construct prediction
algorithms that achieve two goals simultaneously (specific calibration-cum-
resolution and general resolution).
Corollary 4 Let Y be a metric compact and Φn,j : X × P(Y) × Y → Hj ,
n = 1, 2, . . ., j = 0, 1, be functions taking values in Hilbert spaces Hj and such
that Φn,j(x, P, y) is continuous in (P, y) for all n and both j. Let a0 and a1 be
two positive constants. There is a probability forecasting strategy that guarantees
∥∥∥∥∥
N∑
n=1
Ψn,j(xn, Pn, yn)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
Hj
≤ 1
aj
N∑
n=1
(
a0 ‖Ψn,0(xn, Pn, yn)‖2H0 + a1 ‖Ψn,1(xn, Pn, yn)‖
2
H1
)
for all N and for both j = 0 and j = 1, where
Ψn,j (x, P, y) := Φn,j (x, P, y)−
∫
Y
Φn,j (x, P, y)P (dy).
Proof Define the “weighted direct sum” H of H0 and H1 as the Cartesian
product H0 ×H1 equipped with the inner product
〈g, g′〉H = 〈(g0, g1), (g′0, g′1)〉H :=
1∑
j=0
aj〈gj , g′j〉Hj .
Now we can define Φ : X× P(Y)×Y → H by
Φn(x, P, y) := (Φn,0(x, P, y),Φn,1(x, P, y)) .
It is clear that Φn(x, P, y) is continuous in (P, y) for all n. Applying the strategy
of Lemma 4 to it and using (16), we obtain
aj
∥∥∥∥∥
N∑
n=1
Ψn,j(xn, Pn, yn)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
Hj
≤
∥∥∥∥∥
(
N∑
n=1
Ψn,0(xn, Pn, yn),
N∑
n=1
Ψn,1(xn, Pn, yn)
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
H
=
∥∥∥∥∥
N∑
n=1
Ψn(xn, Pn, yn)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
H
≤
N∑
n=1
‖Ψn(xn, Pn, yn)‖2H
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=N∑
n=1
1∑
j=0
aj ‖Ψn,j(xn, Pn, yn)‖2Hj .
Suppose X,Γ,Y are metric compacts and F is a forecast-continuous RKHS
on X × Y. Let Gn : X × P(Y) → Γ be a sequence of approximate choice
functions satisfying
λ(x,Gn(x, P ), P ) < inf
γ∈Γ
λ(x, γ, P ) + 2−n, ∀x ∈ X, P ∈ P(Y)
(they exist by (33)). Corollary 4 will be applied to a0 = a1 = 1 and to the
mappings
Ψn,0(x, P, y) := λ(x,Gn(x, P ), y)− λ(x,Gn(x, P ), P ), (36)
Ψn,1(x, P, y) := kx,y − kx,P , (37)
where kx,y is the evaluation functional at (x, y) for F and kx,P is the mean of
kx,y with respect to P (dy). It is easy to see that
‖Ψn,0(x, P, y)‖R = |Ψn,0(x, P, y)| ≤ cλ, ‖Ψn,1(x, P, y)‖F ≤ 2cF . (38)
Specific calibration-cum-resolution
Corollary 4 immediately implies:
Lemma 14 The probability forecasting strategy of Corollary 4 based on (36)
and (37) guarantees∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
n=1
(
λ(xn, Gn(xn, Pn), yn)− λ(xn, Gn(xn, Pn), Pn)
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
c2λ + 4c
2
F
√
N.
Proof This follows from∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
n=1
(
λ(xn, Gn(xn, Pn), yn)− λ(xn, Gn(xn, Pn), Pn)
)∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤
N∑
n=1
(
c2λ + 4c
2
F
)
(see (38)).
General resolution I
The following lemma is proven similarly to Lemma 7.
Lemma 15 The probability forecasting strategy of Corollary 4 based on (36)
and (37) guarantees∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
n=1
(
λ(xn, D(xn), yn)− λ(xn, D(xn), Pn)
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
c2λ + 4c
2
F ‖λD‖F
√
N.
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Proof This follows from∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
n=1
(
λ(xn, D(xn), yn)− λ(xn, D(xn), Pn)
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
n=1
(
λD(xn, yn)− λD(xn, Pn)
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
n=1
〈λD,kxn,yn − kxn,Pn〉F
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖λD‖F
∥∥∥∥∥
N∑
n=1
(kxn,yn − kxn,Pn)
∥∥∥∥∥
F
≤ ‖λD‖F
√√√√ N∑
n=1
(c2λ + 4c
2
F) =
√
c2λ + 4c
2
F ‖λD‖F
√
N
(we have used Corollary 4 and (38)).
Proof of Theorem 6
Let γn := Gn(xn, Pn) where Pn are produced by the probability forecasting
strategy of Corollary 4 based on (36) and (37). Following (34) and using the
previous two lemmas, we obtain:
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, γn, yn) =
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, Gn(xn, Pn), yn)
=
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, Gn(xn, Pn), Pn)
+
N∑
n=1
(
λ(xn, Gn(xn, Pn), yn)− λ(xn, Gn(xn, Pn), Pn)
)
≤
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, Gn(xn, Pn), Pn) +
√
c2λ + 4c
2
F
√
N
≤
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, D(xn), Pn) +
√
c2λ + 4c
2
F
√
N + 1
=
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, D(xn), yn) +
√
c2λ + 4c
2
F
√
N + 1
−
N∑
n=1
(
λ(xn, D(xn), yn)− λ(xn, D(xn), Pn)
)
≤
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, D(xn), yn) +
√
c2λ + 4c
2
F (‖λD‖F + 1)
√
N + 1.
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Proof of Corollary 3
Since λ(xn, gn, yn)−λ(xn, dn, yn) never exceeds cλ in absolute value, Hoeffding’s
inequality ([9], Corollary A.1) shows that
P
{
N∑
n=1
(
λ(xn, gn, yn)−λ(xn, dn, yn)
)
−
N∑
n=1
(
λ(xn, γn, yn)−λ(xn, D(xn), yn)
)
> t
}
≤ exp
(
− t
2
2c2λN
)
for every t > 0. Choosing t satisfying
exp
(
− t
2
2c2λN
)
= δ,
i.e.,
t := cλ
√
2 ln
1
δ
√
N,
we obtain the statement of Corollary 3.
General resolution II
To prove Theorem 1, we will need the following variation on Lemma 15.
Lemma 16 The probability forecasting strategy of Corollary 4 based on (36)
and (37) guarantees∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
n=1
(
f(xn, yn)−
∫
Y
f(xn, y)P (dy)
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
c2λ + 4c
2
F ‖f‖F
√
N
for any f ∈ F .
Proof Following the proof of Lemma 15:
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
n=1
(
f(xn, yn)−
∫
Y
f(xn, y)Pn(dy)
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
n=1
〈f,kxn,yn − kxn,Pn〉F
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖f‖F
∥∥∥∥∥
N∑
n=1
(kxn,yn − kxn,Pn)
∥∥∥∥∥
F
≤ ‖f‖F
√√√√ N∑
n=1
(c2λ + 4c
2
F) =
√
c2λ + 4c
2
F ‖f‖F
√
N.
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Proof of Theorem 1
As in the proof of Theorem 3, we first assume thatX, Γ, andY are compact. Let
us first see that the prediction algorithm of Theorem 6 fed with a suitable RKHS
guarantees the consequent of (2) for all continuous D. Let F be a universal and
continuous RKHS on X×Y with finite imbedding constant cF .
Fix a continuous decision rule D : X → Γ. For any ǫ > 0, we can find a
function f ∈ F that is ǫ-close in C(X×Y) to λ(x,D(x), y). Following (34) and
the similar chain in the proof of Theorem 6, we obtain:
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, γn, yn) =
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, Gn(xn, Pn), yn)
=
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, Gn(xn, Pn), Pn)
+
N∑
n=1
(
λ(xn, Gn(xn, Pn), yn)− λ(xn, Gn(xn, Pn), Pn)
)
≤
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, Gn(xn, Pn), Pn) +
√
c2λ + 4c
2
F
√
N
≤
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, D(xn), Pn) +
√
c2λ + 4c
2
F
√
N + 1
=
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, D(xn), yn) +
√
c2λ + 4c
2
F
√
N + 1
−
N∑
n=1
(
λ(xn, D(xn), yn)− λ(xn, D(xn), Pn)
)
≤
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, D(xn), yn) +
√
c2λ + 4c
2
F
√
N + 1
−
N∑
n=1
(
f(xn, yn)−
∫
Y
f(xn, y)Pn(y)
)
+ 2ǫN
≤
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, D(xn), yn) +
√
c2λ + 4c
2
F (‖f‖F + 1)
√
N + 1
+ 2ǫN.
We can see that
lim sup
N→∞
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, γn, yn)− 1
N
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, D(xn), yn)
)
≤ 2ǫ;
since this is true for any ǫ > 0, the consequent of (2) holds.
38
It remains to get rid of the assumption of compactness of X, Γ, and Y. We
will need the following lemma.
Lemma 17 Under the conditions of Theorem 1, for each pair of compact sets
A ⊆ X and B ⊆ Y there exists a compact set C = C(A,B) ⊆ Γ such that for
each continuous prediction rule D : X → Γ there exists a continuous prediction
rule D′ : X → C that dominates D in the sense
∀x ∈ A, y ∈ B : λ(x,D′(x), y) ≤ λ(x,D(x), y). (39)
Proof Without loss of generality A and B are assumed non-empty. Fix any
γ0 ∈ Γ. Let
M1 := sup
(x,y)∈A×B
λ(x, γ0, y),
let C1 ⊆ Γ be a compact set such that
∀x ∈ A, γ /∈ C1, y ∈ B : λ(x, γ, y) > M1 + 1,
let
M2 := sup
(x,γ,y)∈A×C1×B
λ(x, γ, y).
and let C2 ⊆ Γ be a compact set such that
∀x ∈ A, γ /∈ C2, y ∈ B : λ(x, γ, y) > M2 + 1.
It is obvious that M1 ≤M2 and γ0 ∈ C1 ⊆ C2.
Let us now check that C1 lies inside the interior of C2. Indeed, for any fixed
(x, y) ∈ A ×B and γ ∈ C1, we have λ(x, γ, y) ≤M2; since λ(x, γ′, y) > M2 + 1
for all γ′ /∈ C2, some neighborhood of γ will lie completely in C2.
Let D : X → Γ be a continuous prediction rule. We will show that (39)
holds for some continuous prediction rule D′ taking values in the compact set
C2. Namely, we define
D′(x) :=

D(x) if D(x) ∈ C1
ρ(D(x),Γ\C2)
ρ(D(x),C1)+ρ(D(x),Γ\C2)
D(x) + ρ(D(x),C1)ρ(D(x),C1)+ρ(D(x),Γ\C2)γ0 if D(x) ∈ C2 \ C1
γ0 if D(x) ∈ Γ \ C2
where ρ is the metric on Γ; the denominator ρ(D(x), C1) + ρ(D(x),Γ \ C2)
is always positive since already ρ(D(x), C1) is positive. Assuming C2 convex
(which can be done by [34], Theorem 3.20(c)), we can see that D′ indeed takes
values in C2. The only points x at which the continuity of D
′ is not obvious are
those for which D(x) lies on the boundary of C1: one has to use the fact that
C1 is covered by the interior of C2.
It remains to check (39); the only non-trivial case is D(x) ∈ C2 \C1. By the
convexity of λ(x, γ, y) in γ, the inequality in (39) will follow from
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ρ(D(x),Γ \ C2)
ρ(D(x), C1) + ρ(D(x),Γ \ C2)λ(x,D(x), y)
+
ρ(D(x), C1)
ρ(D(x), C1) + ρ(D(x),Γ \ C2)λ(x, γ0, y) ≤ λ(x,D(x), y),
i.e.,
λ(x, γ0, y) ≤ λ(x,D(x), y).
Since the left-hand side of the last inequality is at most M1 and its right-hand
side exceeds M1 + 1, it holds true.
For each pair of compact A ⊆ X and B ⊆ Y fix a compact C(A,B) ⊆ Γ
as in the lemma. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3, Predictor’s strategy
ensuring (2) is constructed from Remover’s winning strategy in G(X×Y) and
from Predictor’s strategies S(A,B) outputting predictions γn ∈ C(A,B) and
ensuring the consequent of (2) for D : A→ C(A,B) under the assumption that
(xn, yn) ∈ A × B for given compact A ⊆ X and B ⊆ Y. Remover’s moves are
assumed to be of the form A×B for compact A ⊆ X and B ⊆ Y. Predictor is
simultaneously playing the game of removal G(X×Y) as Evader.
Predictor asks Remover to make his first move A1 × B1 in the game of
removal. Predictor then plays the prediction game using the strategy S(A1, B1)
until Reality chooses (xn, yn) /∈ A1 × B1 (forever if Reality never chooses such
(xn, yn)). As soon as such (xn, yn) is chosen, Predictor announces (xn, yn) in
the game of removal and notes Remover’s response (A2, B2). He then continues
playing the prediction game using the strategy S(A2, B2) until Reality chooses
(xn, yn) /∈ A2 ×B2, etc.
Let us check that this strategy for Predictor will always ensure (2). If Reality
chooses (xn, yn) outside Predictor’s current Ak × Bk finitely often, the conse-
quent of (2) will be satisfied for all continuous D : X → C(AK , BK) ((AK , BK)
being Remover’s last move) and so, by Lemma 17, for all continuousD : X → Γ.
If Reality chooses (xn, yn) outside Predictor’s current Ak ×Bk infinitely often,
the set of (xn, yn), n = 1, 2, . . ., will not be precompact, and so the antecedent
of (2) will be violated.
Proof of Theorem 2
Define
λ(x, γ, y) :=
∫
Γ
λ(x, g, y)γ(dg), (40)
where γ is a probability measure on Γ. This is the loss function in a new
game of prediction with the prediction space P(Γ). When γ ranges over P(C)
(identified with the subset of P(Γ) consisting of the measures concentrated on
C) for a compact C, the loss function (40) is continuous by Lemma 6. We need
the following analogue of Lemma 17.
Lemma 18 Under the conditions of Theorem 2, for each pair of compact sets
A ⊆ X and B ⊆ Y there exists a compact set C = C(A,B) ⊆ Γ such that
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for each continuous randomized prediction rule D : X → P(Γ) there exists a
continuous randomized prediction rule D′ : X → P(C) such that (39) holds (D′
dominates D “on average”).
Proof Define γ0, C1, and C2 as in the proof of Lemma 17. Fix a continuous
function f1 : Γ → [0, 1] such that f1 = 1 on C1 and f1 = 0 on Γ \ C2 (such
an f1 exists by the Tietze–Uryson theorem, [15], 2.1.8). Set f2 := 1 − f1.
Let D : X → P(Γ) be a continuous randomized prediction rule. For each
x ∈ X, split D(x) into two measures on Γ absolutely continuous with respect to
D(x): D1(x) with Radon–Nikodym density f1 and D2(x) with Radon–Nikodym
density f2; set
D′(x) := D1(x) + |D2(x)| δγ0
(letting |P | := P (Γ) for P ∈ P(Γ)). It is clear that D′ is continuous (in the
topology of weak convergence, as usual), takes values in P(C2), and
λ(x,D′(x), y) =
∫
Γ
λ(x, γ, y)f1(γ)D(x)(dγ) + λ(x, γ0, y)
∫
Γ
f2(γ)D(x)(dγ)
≤
∫
Γ
λ(x, γ, y)f1(γ)D(x)(dγ) +
∫
Γ
M1f2(γ)D(x)(dγ)
≤
∫
Γ
λ(x, γ, y)f1(γ)D(x)(dγ) +
∫
Γ
λ(x, γ, y)f2(γ)D(x)(dγ) = λ(x,D(x), y)
for all (x, y) ∈ A×B.
Fix one of the mappings (A,B) 7→ C(A,B) whose existence is asserted by the
lemma.
We will prove that the strategy of the previous subsection with P(C(A,B))
in place of C(A,B) applied to the new game is universally consistent. Let
D : X → P(Γ) be a continuous randomized prediction rule, i.e., a continuous
prediction rule in the new game. Let (AK , BK) be Remover’s last move (if
Remover makes infinitely many moves, the antecedent of (3) is false, and there is
nothing to prove), and letD′ : X → P(C(AK , BK)) be a continuous randomized
prediction rule satisfying (39) with A := AK and B := BK . From some n
on our randomized prediction algorithm produces γn ∈ P(Γ) concentrated on
C(AK , BK), and they will satisfy
lim sup
N→∞
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, γn, yn)− 1
N
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, D(xn), yn)
)
≤ lim sup
N→∞
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, γn, yn)− 1
N
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, D
′(xn), yn)
)
≤ 0. (41)
The loss function is bounded in absolute value on the compact set AK ×
(C(AK , BK) ∪D(AK))×BK by a constant c. The law of the iterated logarithm
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(see, e.g., [37], (5.8)) implies that
lim sup
N→∞
∣∣∣∑Nn=1 (λ(xn, gn, yn)− λ(xn, γn, yn))∣∣∣√
2c2N ln lnN
≤ 1,
lim sup
N→∞
∣∣∣∑Nn=1 (λ(xn, dn, yn)− λ(xn, D(xn), yn))∣∣∣√
2c2N ln lnN
≤ 1
with probability one. Combining the last two inequalities with (41) gives
lim sup
N→∞
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, gn, yn)− 1
N
N∑
n=1
λ(xn, dn, yn)
)
≤ 0 a.s.
This immediately implies (3).
8 Conclusion
In this section I will list what I think are interesting directions of further re-
search.
The data space as a bottleneck
It is easy to see that if we set X :=
∑∞
n=0 Y
n and
xn := (y1, . . . , yn−1) ,
it becomes impossible to compete even with the simplest prediction rules
D : X → Y: there needs be no connection between the restrictions of D to
Yn for different n. The requirement that y1, . . . , yn−1 should be compressed
into an element xn of a locally compact space X restricts the set of possible
prediction rules so that it becomes manageable. We can consider X to be the
necessary bottleneck in our notion of a prediction rule, and the requirement of
local compactness of X makes it narrow enough for us to be able to compete
with all continuous prediction rules. A natural question is: can the requirement
of the local compactness of X be weakened while preserving the existence of
on-line prediction algorithms competitive with the continuous prediction rules?
(And it should be remembered that our (2) might be a poor formalization of
the latter property if sizeable pieces of X cannot be expected to be compact.)
Randomization
It appears that various aspects of randomization in this paper and competitive
on-line prediction in general deserve further study. For example, the bound
of Corollary 3 is based on the worst possible outcome of Predictor’s random-
ization and the best possible outcome of the prediction rule’s randomization
(disregarding an event of probability at most δ). This is unfair to Predictor. Of
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course, comparing the expected values of Predictor’s and the prediction rule’s
loss would be an even worse solution: this would ignore the magnitude of the
likely deviations of the loss from its expected value. It would be too crude to use
the variance as the only indicator of the likely deviations, and it appears that
the right formalization should involve the overall distribution of the deviations.
A related observation is that, when using a prediction strategy based on
defensive forecasting, Predictor needs randomization only when there are several
very different predictions with similar expected losses with respect to the current
probability forecast Pn. Since Pn are guaranteed to agree with reality, we would
not expect that Predictor will often find himself in such a position provided
Reality is neutral (rather than an active opponent). Predictor’s strategy will be
almost deterministic. It would be interesting to formalize this intuition.
Limitations of competitive on-line prediction
In conclusion, I will briefly discuss two serious limitations of this paper.
First, the main results of this paper only concern one-step-ahead prediction.
In a more general framework the loss function would depend not only on yn
but on other future outcomes as well. There are simple ways of extending our
results in this direction: e.g., if the loss function λ = λ(xn, γn, yn, yn+1) depends
on both yn and yn+1, we could run two on-line prediction algorithms with the
observation space Y2, one responsible for choosing γn for odd n and the other
for even n. However, cleaner and more principled approaches are needed.
As we noted earlier (see Remark 1), the general interpretation of D-
predictions is that they are decisions made by a small decision maker. To see
why the decision maker is assumed small, let us consider (1), which the kind of
guarantee (such as (35)) provided in competitive on-line prediction (although
see [9], Section 7.11, for a recent advance). Predictor’s and the prediction rule
D’s losses are compared on the same sequence x1, y1, x2, y2, . . . of data and ob-
servations. If Predictor is a big decision maker (i.e., his decisions affect Reality’s
future behavior) the interpretation of (1) becomes problematic: presumably,
x1, y1, x2, y2, . . . resulted from Predictor’s decisions γn, and D’s loss should be
evaluated on a different sequence: the sequence x∗1, y
∗
1 , x
∗
2, y
∗
2 , . . . resulting from
D’s decisions D(xn).
The approach of this paper is based on defensive forecasting: the ability to
produce ideal, in important aspects, probability forecasts. It is interesting that
ideal probability forecasts are not sufficient in big decision making. As a simple
example, consider the game where there is no X, Γ = Y = {0, 1}, and the loss
function λ is given by the matrix
y = 0 y = 1
γ = 0 1 2
γ = 1 2 0
Reality’s strategy is yn := γn, but Predictor’s initial theory is that Reality
always chooses yn = 0.
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Predictor’s “optimal” strategy based on his initial beliefs is to always choose
γn = 0 suffering loss 1 at each step. His initial beliefs are reinforced with every
move by Reality. Intuitively it is clear that Predictor’s mistake in not choosing
γn ≡ 1 is that he was being greedy (concentrated on exploitation and completely
neglected exploration). However,
• he acted optimally given his beliefs,
• his beliefs have been verified by what actually happened.
In big decision making we have to worry about what would have happened if
we had acted in a different way.
My hope is that game-theoretic probability has an important role to play
in big decision making as well. A standard picture in the philosophy of science
(see, e.g., [33, 25]) is that science progresses via struggle between (probabilistic)
theories, and it is conceivable that something like this also happens in individual
(human and animal) learning. Based on good theories (the ones that survives
serious attempts to overthrow them) we can make good decisions. Testing of
probabilistic theories is crucial in this process, and the game-theoretic version
of the testing process (gambling against the theory) is much more flexible than
the standard approach to testing statistical hypotheses: at each time we know
to what degree the theory has been falsified. It is important, however, that the
skeptic testing the theory should not only do this playing the imaginary game
with the imaginary capital; he should also venture in the real world. Predictor’s
theory that Reality always chooses yn = 0 would not survive for more than one
round had it been tested (by choosing a sub-optimal, from the point of view of
the old theory, decision).
Big decision making is a worthy goal but it is very difficult to prove anything
about it, and elegant mathematical results might be beyond our reach for some
time. Small decision making is also important but much easier; in many cases
we can do it almost perfectly.
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